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Origins of Indian Nationalism: 
Some Questions on the Historiography 
of Modem India 
It is rather difficult to study the history of nationalism dispassionately. 
Whether we want to or not we all tend to take a partisan view of the 
subject. The outstanding phenomenon of contemporary history ( 1966) is 
the rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa. We have already gone 
through what one author has called the 'climax of nationalism' in 
Europe, which ended in two bloody wars and the mass slaughter of 
millions in the name of racial superiority .1 It may be said that during 
the second world war the forces of nationalism suffered a severe blow 
in Europe and in America. But it has now become one of the most 
important forces in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is generally 
recognised that all the outstanding and dangerous political conflicts such 
as Vietnam or Southern Rhodesia are direct or indirect effects of the 
rise of nationalism in these parts of the world. We may take a gloomy 
and pessimistic view of the future of the world and agree with professor 
Carlton Hayes that: 
modern nationalism has partaken of the nature of religion, 
moderns may regard their medieval ancestors' veneration of 
images, icons and relics as savouring of superstition, but let them 
replace, say, a statue of St. Joseph with a graven image of 
Abraham Lincoln, an icon of the blessed Virgin with a lithograph 
of Martha Washington or of the somewhat mythical Molly 
Pitcher, and a relic of the Holy Cross with a tattered battle flag 
and they display a fitting reverence. If we recall the likenesses of 
national fathers and heroes which adorn both the sumptuous clubs 
of the wealthy and the simple cottages of the poor we can 
appreciate the religious appeal of contemporary nationalism.2 
l Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism, New York, 1962, pp. 61· 71. 
2 Carlton J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: a Religion, New York, 1960, p. 171. 
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As nationalism of the present age has an ever-growing number of 
jealous and quarrelsome sects, there is no hope of peace in the near 
future. Toleration came only after bloody civil wars costing many lives 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so international 
toleration could only be possible after many more wars. Europe and 
America may have learnt their lessons; Africa, Asia and Latin America 
have a long way to go. As a Christian Professor, Hayes finds the only 
way of hope in this world in Christianity. He commented: 
As a Christian, I earnestly believe that in measure as lands in 
Africa and Asia tolerate Christian missions (that are themselves 
without taint of European imperialism), and under the influence 
of Christian faith and morals, the rising obsessive nationalism on 
those continents will be rendered less exclusive and belligerent 
and more in keeping with international cooperation and peace. '3 
I do not, however, share Hayes's views- neither his diagnosis nor his 
medicine. I am inclined to take a rather more optimistic view. I agree 
with Professor Kohn4 that nationalism is a stage forward towards pan-
humanism. The present phase of aggressive nationalism is essential for 
the establishment of social justice, equality of opportunity and freedom 
from want for the common man in Africa, Asia and Latin America. I 
do not think it is essential to appeal to the religious sense and hope to 
replace one superstition for another, Christianity for nationalism, as 
Professor Hayes does. The international secular political creeds such as. 
liberalism and socialism will eventually have such desirable sobering 
effects on nationalism (especially socialism, since economic uplifting 
requires a collective-cum-state initiative). 
In my opinion, whatever the future shape of the world, the rise of 
Afro-Asian nationalism marks the beginning of a new era in human 
history, so it is worth applauding. Thus it is not possible to study 
nationalism without any bias; we either consider it an evil, a dangerous 
force sweeping across the continents demanding thousands of human 
lives, or a progressive force which is at present going through its 
teething troubles and ultimately leading to international co-operation 
and peace. 
3 Ibid,. p. 182. 




Whatever opinion we may choose to take we still have to define the 
term 'nationalism'. The words 'nation' and 'nationalism' are not easy to 
define. This is not just a problem of semantics; any term describing 
social and political groups such as family, state, class, etc., is subject to 
varied interpretations, but the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' have so 
much emotive force in them that they defeat any attempt to make a 
scientific definition. The psychologist may consider the problem of 
nationalism as the problem of group integration. The psychological 
factor undoubtedly is important; it is the desire to unite and the feeling 
of sharing a common culture which makes an aggregate of individuals a 
nation. But this approach would ignore the fact that a nation is a human 
group which has evolved historically; in other words it belongs to a 
more or less definite epoch in history. In the ancient and, medieval 
periods there were empires, kingdoms, tribal republics, city states, but 
not nations. Undoubtedly there were 'nationalities', meaning cultural 
and ethnic groups, for a long time. Thus in ancient periods there were 
Goths, Romans, Teutons in Europe and Indians and Persians in Asia, 
and so on. 
In Europe the nation states emerged with the breakdown of 
Christendom and the rise of mercantile capitalism. But during the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a nation was 
identified with the rulers and the dynasties and the so-called 
international laws were in fact agreements between or among the rulers. 
It is only under the impact of the 'double revolution' - the French and 
the Industrial - that nationalism in the modern sense of the term 
developed in Europe. It may be said that 'nationality', meaning the 
cultural entity of a mass of people, was identified with 'nation' only 
during the course of the nineteenth century .5 It developed 
simultaneously with the idea of popular sovereignty. It grew when the 
notion of rulers and the ruled underwent a complete revision. In 
France, Great Britain and the U.S.A. nationalism found expression 
through economic and social changes. In Germany in the early 
nineteenth century it found its expression through cultural awakening of 
the classes, which later turned into the desire for the formation of a 
nation-state. So the growth of nationalism could be described as a 
'process of integration of the masses of the people into a common 
political form'. 6 It seems to me that the Marxist definition of a nation, 
5 E. J. Hobsbwam, The Age of Revolution, Europe 1789-1848. London, 1962, pp. 
132-145. 
6 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 4. 
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which was also generally accepted by a study group of members of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a workable definition. 7 So a 
nation may be defined as an aggregate of individuals, historically 
evolved, living within a given territory, having faith in a common 
heritage and culture, living or aspiring to live under a centralised 
government over the territory. The movements for national freedom 
are led by a group in the nation which has gained new strength owing to 
economic changes since the development of mercantile capitalism. Such 
movements may aim at getting a better deal for this class, but 
nationalism cuts across class and group interests in a given society and is 
conducted in the name of national unity. Although national movements 
are primarily political in nature, they affect all major sectors of life of 
the society - cultural, economic and political. 
When we apply these definitions of a 'nation' and 'nationalism' to the 
Indian situation, we find that India has never been a nation. It is 
generally described as a sub-continent of many nations and other 
cultural groups. The diversity of culture is easy to see; there are 
numerous social groups, regional languages and different faiths without 
even including the tribal peoples. There has been much controversy 
among scholars over the question of the unity of India. What is not 
often recognised by many historians is the fact that despite the regional 
and cultural diversities there is an essential unity of culture in India. 
India has inherited a rich civilisation from the past which is shared by 
all. This culture perhaps originated in the Indus valley, developed in the 
Ganga-Jamuna doab and spread throughout the sub-continent before the 
beginning of the Christian era. Even the Kaveri delta, the heartland of 
Tamil culture, was not quite free from the influence of the Gangetic 
civilisation. This civilisation was carried by the Brahmins - even now 
the Brahmins are the only varna or jati which exist universally 
throughout the sub-continent- and Sanskrit was its lingua franca. We 
can say that Brahminism is the apotheosis of Indian civilisation, and 
despite the differences, it is widely accepted by the Indians throughout 
the country. If we had a neat mind like that of the late nationalist 
historian Sardar K. M. Panikkar, we could look at the development of 
modern India merely as an interaction of two cultures, Brahminical and 
Western.s But this would exclude the Muslims. Although Islam brought 
7 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Questions, Calcutta, 1952, p. 7; cf. 
Nationalism: A report by a study group of members of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Oxford, 1939, pp. xx and 249-63. 
8 K. M. Pannikkar, Foundations of New India, London, 163, pp. 11-23. 
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a new creed to India which in the final analysis failed to assimilate fully 
with the non-Islamic religions, there was no cultural apartheid in India 
during the pre-modern period. We may, according to our political 
creeds, exaggerate or minimise the differences between the two 
cultures, but what is indisputable is the fact that Islam was Indianised to 
a great extent, and, on the other hand Brahminism was profoundly 
influenced by Islam. There was a court culture at the top level which 
was shared by a Hindu-Muslim elite. They shared a common interest in 
polo, elephant fighting, court music, miniature painting and a common 
code of dress. The lingua franca was Persian. At the village level the 
newly-converted lived as another jati often paying reverence with equal 
zeal to the local deities, especially the malevolent ones such as the snake 
goddess and the smallpox goddess. Thus we can describe India as a 
cultural area or a 'nationality', according to our definition, with sub-
cultures within this area, Islam being one of them. · 
It is generally suggested that India never obtained political unity until 
the coming of British rule, but it is not easy to draw a precise map of 
the Indian civilisation. There has always been some disputed territory. 
Thus Afghanistan had always been a part of India, both culturally ~nd 
politically, until the emergence of Ahmed Shah Abdali in the eighteenth 
century. The British succeeded in bringing the southern part of India 
under one administration, but never 'recovered' Afghanistan. This 
unification lasted less than a century only and there had been empires 
before the British which had succeeded in bringing a large part of the 
sub-continent under one administration. Moreover, the unification of 
India was a dream which was present throughout her history. This was 
the central theme of the epic Mahabharata, and in Arthasastra, 
chakravarti-khesetra, the land of the universal emperor, covered almost 
the whole of the sub-continent. Thus there had always been a desire, at 
least among certain social groups who mattered in the Indian politics of 
ancient times, to bring the whole sub-continent under one government. 
This ideal received practical expression in the foundation of various 
empires from time to time. 
The Indo-Muslim Empire during the period of the Delhi Sultanate 
(1206-1525) achieved control of the greater part of north India. There 
was a complex administrative machinery managed at the top level by the 
Muslims, especially by those of foreign extraction, while the junior 
posts were manned by the Hindus. However, it was Akbar who first 
found a theoretical basis for the unity of the two communities. Akbar 
established a cult of divine monarchy which demanded loyalty from 
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subjects of all sects. It seems that the Mughals succeeded in establishing 
a system of polity based on the cooperation of the two main 
communities. The Mughal empire can be called the Rajput-Mughal 
Empire. The conception of the divine right to rule lasted until the very 
end of the empire. Even Raja Rammohun Roy, despite his modernity, 
was a loyal subject of the Mughal King Akbar II (then a nonentity in 
practical politics).9 The Mughals started the work of developing 
administrative unity; their efforts were frustrated in the eighteenth 
century, but completed by the British in the nineteenth century. Without 
the Mughals, as Spear has said, 'The British could not have organised 
India as they did, if the people had not already been, as it were, 
apprenticed to the idea of unity. Nor in consequence could independent 
India have grown so quickly in unity and strength.' 1o 
So it is possible to recognise an all-India culture and a process of 
administrative unity, despite communal and regional differences, during 
the pre-British period. All this has contributed towards the growth of 
nationalism in India. But there was no nation-state and no nationalist 
government at this period. Efforts have been made by many historians 
to trace the growth of nationalism in India to the resistance movements 
of the Marathas and Sikhs during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. It is indisputable that at times the Maratha resistance against 
the Mughals and later against the British took the character of 
nationalism, meaning a fight for political independence by a group 
which has some cultural affinity. But this did not leave any lasting effect 
upon the growth of nationalism in modern India. It is correct to say that 
the myth of Sivaji played a more important role in modern Maratha 
nationalism than did the historical rebellion. II 
However, if we are ready to widen the scope of our definition and 
agree with Edmund Burke that nationalism .is an uprising of a whole 
community under the leadership of the governing class in defence of 
what they. consider ancient liberty and against violent innovations, one 
could see the rise of regional nationalism in India since the end of the 
seventeenth century. Thus Chait Singh, the Maharajah of Benaras, may 
be considered as the first anti-British nationalist hero; at least Burke 
thought so: 
9 Raja Ramrnohun Roy to the Heir-apparent, Delhi, 10 November 1830, as published 
in B. N. Banerjee's Raja Rammohun Roy's Mission to England, Calcutta, 1926. 
IO Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, London, 1965, p. 51. 
11 For the Modernist-Nationalist views on Shivaji see M. G. Ranade, Rise of the 
Maratha Power, Bombay, 1900. 
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The subjects of this unfortunate prince did what we should have 
done; what all who loved their country, who loved their liberty, 
who loved their laws, who loved their property, who loved their 
sovereign would have done on such an occasion ... The whole 
country rose up in rebellion and surely in justifiable rebellion.I2 
Such backward-looking nationalism defending 'ancient liberty' played 
an important role in the development of the modern nationalist 
movements in India. But the genesis of Indian political development of 
the modern period cannot be traced back to the armed revolts of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The social base of the new 
development was entirely different. 
So nationalism is a modern force in India. The political agitation of 
the middle classes for the Indianisation of the administration and for the 
gradual democratisation of· the Indian legislatures, was one 
manifestation of the growing nationalism in the late nineteenth century. 
But the political agitation was the culmination of a social change which 
had been taking place ever since the emergence of British power in 
Bengal in the eighteenth century. It seems there is general agreement 
among scholars that the development of modern india is somehow 
related to the establishment of the British Raj. That the two centuries of 
British rule had brought fundamental changes to Indian life is not in 
dispute. What, however, is not clear is whether the changes were due to 
the conscious efforts on· the part of the British officers working as 
guardians to alter the Indian way of life or whether they were the mere 
unconscious tools of history. We are not sure through what agencies, if 
any, the British changed the Indian way of life - the civil service, 
English law, English education or the Christian Missionaries - or how 
far the traditional society conditioned the growth of modern India. 
This leads us to the question of historians and methods of history. All 
history, it is said, 'veers over into Whig history'. The method of history 
which studies the past with reference to the present is called by 
Professor Butterfield a Whig interpretation of history .13 However, it is 
not a vice or virtue peculiar to the English Protestant Whig historian to 
study 'the past with an eye on the present'. It is to be found in most 
historians; either consciously or unconsciously they mirror the age in 
12 The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Bohm's edition, London, 
1873, vol. viii, pp. 39-40. 
13 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, London, 1959, p. 6. 
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which they live. In an age when political controversies are sharp and 
issues are clear-cut, historians, like other citizens, tend to take rather 
partisan views and history is then used to serve their own political 
interests. Thus during the time when the movement for national 
freedom in India was at its height, history was used as a weapon both to 
further the Indian cause and to attack it. Being humiliated by foreign 
rule, India had to assert her personality and prove the ability of her sons 
to manage their own affairs. So the Indians drew heavily on their past 
glories. The British on the other hand had ro find a raison d 'etre for 
their authoritarian rule in India and so used history to explain the 
existing situation. It is my contention that the Independence Act of 1947 
has not basically affected English historical writings on India. There is 
now (in 1966) a new Whig interpretation of history by the British 
historians. We have now an evolutionary theory which looks-at Indian 
history as a process of development since Bentick and Macaulay. The 
history of India is presented to us as the history of British India only. It 
deals almost solely with the administrative policies and the problems of 
implementing such policies. Attention is drawn almost exclusively to 
British activities, as it is considered that the history of India should be 
looked upon, as Dodwell put it, as 'a great British effort to transform 
into ari organic state the inorganic despotism which the crown had 
inherited from the Company and the Company from the previous Indian 
governments' .14 To them the development of modern India owes little 
or nothing to the traditional society and culture. 
It is suggested that in Asia and Africa there are two different types of 
nationalism. In Africa one is called 'Western-educated', the other is 
called 'tribalism' .15 In India it is called moderate and forward-looking, 
and extremist and backward-looking. It seems to me that the moderates 
are thought to be on the side of God for they alone appreciated the 
virtues of British institutions and helped the gradual growth of, what the 
Montague Declaration called, the /self-governing institutions in India'. 
The extremists are ignored or condemned for they are on the side of 
Satan and responsible for the fragmentation of Indian society. Professor 
Hugh Tinker of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London 
has recently suggested that we should look upon the development of 
recent Ir.dian history as an area of cooperation between Britain and 
14 H. H. Dodwell, Cambridge History of India, Cambridge, 1923, vol.vi, p. vii. 
15 Hayes, Nationalism, p. 161. 
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India and not an area of conflict between the two.l6 This thesis, which is 
generally upheld by the British historians, implies that Indian 
development owes nothing to the traditional society or to Gandhi, Bose, 
Nehru and the rriass movements, but to the British efforts. The British 
historians, I am afraid, have not given us any satisfactory answer to the 
questions concerning the political development" in modem India. The 
history of India cannot be understood solely in terms of Western impact 
and the British administrative reforms as this fails to explain the 
immense dynamism of Indian society; we cannot in these terms 
understand how India withstood the cultural challenge of the West and 
showed an amazing vitality which proved wrong all the old theories of 
its being a stagnant society. 
Nor can we learn why all the Indian leaders from Rammohan to 
Gandhi insisted that all their plans for social reforms were not 
innovations, but were to be found in early India, so that they had to dig 
out passages from classical Indian texts to gain sanctions for their 
actions. In other words, if we think that nationalism was solely the 
product of British rule, not only do we belittle the achievements of the 
Indian leaders, but we take away a full dimension from Indian histC!ry, 
by underestimating the role of the traditional society and institutions in 
moulding modem India. We shall then be asked to reject Indian political 
ideas as secondhand and shall fail to distinguish the difference between 
borrowing and assimilating. Vivekananda did not just borrow the 
Christian idea of service, but he grafted it on to the Indian idea of 
asceticism. Similarly, old institutions such as the caste system survived, 
constantly readjusting themselves with the changing times. India also 
inherited a complex administrative system from the Moghuls, as I have 
already mentioned, especially in relation to the collection of land 
revenue. The British kept many features of the old system, and it has 
had a lasting influence on the modem Indian organisation of land and 
taxation. I? 
This does not mean that the Indian historians necessarily give us a 
corrective antidote to the British interpretation of history. Indian 
historical writing can be equally tendentious, and by adding the speech 
for the defence to the speech for the prosecution we do not gain true 
16 Hugh Tinker, Reorientations: Studies on Asia in Transition, London, 1965, pp. 77-
106. 
17 For my criticism of modem British scholarship on Indian history see S. N. 
Mukherjee (ed.), South Asian Affairs, no. 2, St. Antony's Papers, no. 18, Oxford, 
1966, pp. 9-18. 
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history. Indian historians have also. developed their own interpretation 
of history. They concentrate their attention on the Congress movements, 
the political agitations during the early part of the twentieth century or 
to Gandhi and his associates They trace the origins of Indian nationalism 
to the Western impact only. According to this theory, Indian leaders set 
about to change their society being inspired by English education and 
being challenged by Christian missionaries. This is how Sardar Panikkar 
understood the Indian development and Dr Tara Chand put out a similar 
thesis.18 This only concentrates on the new elite, ignores the masses and 
fails to discover the lines of communication between the masses and 
classes, and the necessary organic unity between the cultural and social 
changes iri the nineteenth century and the political unrest of the 
twentieth century. 
Likewise the Pakistani official historians have their own 
interpretation of history. They call upon their readers to look at the 
history of India, since the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, as a history of 
clashes between the Muslims and non-Muslims. 19 Ironically, they find 
many supporters among the Hindu nationalist historians such as 
Professor R. C. Majumdar.2o 
It has been suggested that the sociological method with Namier-type 
dissection of the Congress Party may give us some answers to many 
bewildering questions concerning India.21 This may be a sound method 
for the study of comparatively static political structures, like the mid--
eighteenth century British parliament, but it can hardly explain a 
dynamic political movement like nationalism. The study of the group 
feuds and the social background of the Indian political leaders are 
important, but Indian development cannot be understood solely in terms 
of power politics. Men in India did not go into politics during the pre-
independence period purely for power. They made considerable 
sacrifices; some lost their careers, wealth and even their lives. They 
were inspired by ideas and fought for a cause which they considered 
great. We need to know the social causes to explain a complex situation; 
the Namierite dissection will not reveal all the veins and arteries of 
Indian nationalism. 
18 Tarachand, History of the Freedom Movement in India. New Delhi, 1965, pp. 1-38. 
19 I. H. Qureshi, The struggle for Pakistan, Karachi, 1965, pp. 1-17. 
20 R. C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Calcutta, 1971, pp. 
xi-xxi. 
21 J. Gallagher, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in Modern Indian History', in Problems 
of Historical Writings in India, Delhi, 1963 .. 
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The historians of ancient India have now discovered that they can 
interpret some of the ancient records and archaeological finds better 
when they see them through the light of studies of tribes and of 'the 
social clusters that survive even in the heart of fully developed areas in 
and around cities with others which mark all strata of a caste society'. In 
other words, social anthropological and sociological tools are useful to 
understand ancient India, for in India 'people of the atomic age rub 
elbows with those of the Chalcolithic age'. This particular law has to be 
recognised by the historians of modem India.22 
We have to work through a multidimensional model both in the 
towns and in the villages, among the cultivated elite and the inarticulate 
peasants. It will then be possible to understand such complex 
development as the rise of a class of collaborators who later turned into 
an anti-imperialist force and found a common platform with the masses 
of the villages. We will also be able to find the link between the social 
upheaval in the nineteenth century and the political unrest during the 
twentieth century. So we should work in close collaboration with 
scholars from other disciplines- sociology, anthropology, economics, 
political science and the historians of literature. The study of literature 
is important; according to Professor Nelson Blake, novels and poems 
leave a record of experience of the author which can never be found 
among the traditional records in libraries and archives. Thus Mark 
Twain's Huckleberry Finn describes mid-nineteenth century life along 
the Mississippi better than any other contemporary record.23 It is 
needless to add that litemture cannot be used as a primary source of 
history indiscriminately. But to get a feeling of the age, literature can be 
a great guide. In India men expressed their views more freely in fiction 
and in poetry than in political pamphlets or private papers. 
I have already said that the political agitation of the new classes was 
the culmination of a social change which started in Bengal during the 
second half of the eighteenth century. In other words, nationalism is a 
product of the disruption of the old economic and social order. This 
disruption took place not so much because the British officers set out to 
change the destiny of India but because of the growth of a market 
society. A market society may be defined as a society in which 
production and distribution of goods and services is regulated by the 
22 D. D. Kosambi, An Introduction to the Study of Indian History, Bombay, 1956, pp. 
7-8. 
23 Nelsom N. Blake, 'How to learn history from Sinclair Lewis and other uncommon 
sources', Stetson University Bulletin, vol. iv, July 1964, no. 2, p. 2. 
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market. In such a society each individual's capacity to labour is his own 
property and is inalienable Such a society through the free market of 
land and labour provides opportunities for individuals and for social 
groups to acquire unlimited wealth and power and thus alter their social 
position. This is an ideal type, but the basic features of such a society 
could be found in Europe since the days of mercantile capitalism. This 
may be called an 'open society' or 'an economic frontier'. Personally I 
prefer the term 'market society' for although it puts the emphasis on the 
economic factor - the market - it describes the social and political 
relationships between individuals and social groups fairly adequately. 
Professor Brown has said that nationalism in Europe was a by 
product of a long period of unusual economic growth led by a segment 
of the nation which had gained new strength and which in the name of 
national ideas and national symbols worked to broaden the base of the 
political structure and to force greater political and social mobility. 
Under such circumstances we have the birth of what he has termed an 
'open society'. However, he thinks that in Asia the established ruling 
groups remained in power and made adjmtments to the new situations 
without making any basic alterations in the traditional social 
relationships.24 This may be true for Japan, but India followed the 
European pattern at least in this respect. 
Land was and still is a source of wealth and power both at the village 
level and at the top. The sale and transfer of land in India means the 
transfer of power from one group of individuals to another group of 
individuals. In the village in Orissa described by Professor Bailey, land 
changed hands with the encroachment of what he has called the 
'economic frontier', and consequently power changed hands along the 
same lines. According to the records that are available for before 1885, 
the Kshatriya caste owned all the land, but by 1952-54 only 28 per cent 
of the land belonged to this group. The rest of the land belonged either 
to other caste groups in the village, or to new-comers from outside, 
who bought land with money earned from activities other than 
agriculture.2s This has happened in a comparatively remote village 
where the economic frontier and the administrative machinery was slow 
to arrive. The pace of change in the Ganga-Jamuna valley, where there 
were better communications and an older administrative machinery, 
. must have been far greater. We do not know enough until some graphic 
24 Delmar M. Brown, Nationalism in India, Los Angeles, 1955, pp. 1-5. 
25 F. G. Bailey, Caste and the Economic Frontier, Oxford, 1958. pp. 165-73. 
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studies at the grassroot level are done. In Bengal similar changes also 
took place, and a new class of Zamindars emerged. Such social changes 
were possible because there was a free market in labour and land which 
provided the facilities for the acquisition of wealth and power. It is 
irrelevant for our purpose to argue whether the trade followed the flag 
or the flag followed the trade, but it is sufficient· to say that the growth 
of the market society is somehow related to the establishment of the 
British Raj in the eighteenth century. During the course of the 
nineteenth century the market society and British power spread 
throughout the sub-continent. British trade penetrated the country and 
the new land regulations changed the entire way of life. Such 
regulations did not create a new set of rights; for the ownership of land 
as a de facto right was already in existence in many parts of the country, 
and it was recognised by many English officers before Cornwallis. But 
the regulations clearly defined such rights, and what is more important 
they made land an alienable commodity and allowed capital to purchase 
an unlimited amount. 
One direct effect of the market society was the creation of a new 
urban elite. This elite increased in number and wealth, lived in Calcutta, 
Bombay and Madras and other trade and administrative centres 
throughout India, lived on trade and money-lending, a share of the land 
revenue and on salaries received as junior administrative officers. This 
group cannot be fitted into the traditional system of social stratification. 
Those who could earn enough wealth or achieve some intellectual 
standing through the new English education were accepted as members 
of the new elite. Although members were mainly Hindus, caste did not 
play an essential part in selection. 
This group can be described as the new middle class. They were a de 
facto group - that is, there was no legal or religious sanction behind 
their status in society. They recognised very clearly that they owed their 
status to the British administration and the new economy. Originally, 
their religious and social reforms were directed against the traditional 
institutions. The history of modern India since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century may be described as the history of the struggle of 
this new class to find an identity. As the traditional norms which kept 
the old society together were inadequate, a new code of behaviour was 
necessary. This is one reason why there was such a wave of social and 
religious reforms pressed for by this class, and later came the demands 
for political reforms. During the course of the nineteenth century, this 
class grew in strength - undoubtedly with the help of the British. They 
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eagerly cooperated with the British officers and took no part in the anti-
British revolt of 1857. They gradually began to utilise their strength for 
a better deal for themselves. They were, as Lord Dufferin thought, a 
'microscopic minority', but what Lord Dufferin and many other notable 
British officers failed to understand was that it was a growing minority, 
and what is more important is that the middle class waged their struggle 
in the name of national ideals and through national symbols, and helped 
to broaden the base of the political structure and forced an even greater 
political and social mobility.26 The aims of Sir Surendranath Banerjee's 
Indian Association, the predecessor of the Indian National Congress, 
were: 'one, the creation of a strong body of public opinion in the 
country; two, the unification of Indian races and peoples upon the basis 
of common political interests and aspirations; thr-ee, the promotion of 
friendly feelings between the Hindus and Mohammedans and lastly 
inclusion of the masses in the great public movements. '27 
This was an Indian nation in the making. However it was only after 
the emergence of Gandhi as a political guru in 1920 that the masses and 
the classes were brought together on one political platform. The new 
elite, who had believed in Britain and was influenced by the Western. 
ideologies, was finally disillusioned. The celebrated Montague-
Chelmsford reforms failed to satisfy Indian opinion. In India the 
recommendation of the Rowlatt Report to try seditious cases without 
juries or witnesses was enacted in January 1919. Mahatma Gandhi 
declared hartal. He was arrested and riots followed in the Punjab. The 
Amritsar massacre and the vote of approval of the repression by the 
House of Lords finally led Gandhi to call upon the Indians to dissociate 
themselves from what he called the satanic government. There were 
men of SirS. N. Banerjee's generation who still had faith in Britain, but 
they lost control of the public. The disillusionment can be noticed in the 
history of one family, the Tagore family. It was the poet's grandfather 
who actively supported the British and was a friend of the Free Traders. 
The poet himself was inspired by English liberalism and had faith in the 
'generosity of the English race'. But in his last testament written from 
his death bed, The Crisis of Civilisation, Tagore said: 
The wheels of fate will some day compel the English to give up 
their Indian empire. But what kind of India will they leave 
26 S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858-1905, Cambridge, 1965, pp. 167-76. 




behind, what stark misery? When the stream of their centuries of 
administration runs dry at last, what a waste of filth and mud will 
they leave behind! I had one time believed that the springs of 
civilisation would issue out of the heart of Europe but today when 
I am about to quit the world, that faith has gone bankrupt 
altogether. 28 
Thus a class of collaborators turned into an anti-imperialist force. 
However, if we concentrate only on the elite, we do not get the full 
picture. We ignore the fact that the market society changed the way of 
life even in the villages and the local administrative centres. It created a 
social erosion which affected the very basis of the society. Although the 
masses came to the political arena only after the emergence of Gandhi as 
leader in 1920, the movements for social and religious reforms have 
been going on since the nineteenth century even among the lower strata 
at the village level. In fact as far as one could detect from the evidence 
at present available, it seems that the traditional society reacted to the 
new system in three ways. Firstly, there was a constant shift of status at 
all levels, social groups expressed in terms of caste and religion moved 
up or down according to their capacity to control the new productive 
forces and work within the new administrative machinery. 
Sanskritisation, meaning the way of elevating the ritual rank of a social 
group who have gained economically, is one manifestation of this social 
mobility. Secondly, there were numerous social and religious 
movements such as the new Sakti cult in Bengal and the Faraidiyah 
movement among the Bengali Muslim peasants. Ramkrishna was only 
one of the many traditional religious leaders who emerged during the 
nineteenth century. One knows of him because his ideas were 
interpreted to us by Vivekananda. Thirdly, the old society rejected the 
market and took up arms against the British. There were continuous 
struggles by peasant groups, tribes, princes and some religious sects 
throughout the nineteenth century. The 1857 revolt was the most 
important expression of such reaction against the British and the new 
system, although it was not the last. It may be considered a negative 
response to the market society. But they were not always backward-
looking. There were men like Tipu Sultan of Mysore who were eager. to 
adapt the new techniques- military, political and economic -to use 
against the British and their allies. The armed struggles should not be 
2H R. N. Tagore. The Crisis of' Civilisation, Calcutta, 1941. 
J 18 
Indian Nationalism 
thought of as purely anti-British, but also anti-market society. The 
peasant revolts were directed as much against the new landlords and 
money-lenders as against the British. Nor could they be regarded as 
purely religious, directed against other religious groups like Muslims 
against Hindus or Christians. It is significant to note that Shah Abdul 
Aziz, the great Muslim theologist, issued his famous fatwa only in 1803 
when the Mughal king Shah Alam was brought under British protection, 
declaring that India had ceased to be Dar ul Islam, and has become Dar 
ul Harb - the land of the enemy. But Shah Aziz did not issue such a 
fatwa during the Maratha occupation of Delhi between 1782 and 1803 
when Shah Alam was a figure-head under the Maratha protection. Shah 
Aziz found in the ascendancy of the East India Company the total 
disintegration of the traditional Muslim society. Hence he wrote to 
Hindus and Muslims to unite to fight against the British.29 
So the growth of nationalism in India is a complex problem. It can be 
understood only through a multidimensional method; otherwise we tend 
to put emphasis on one group at the ·expense of others. If modern Indian 
politics is conducted through three idioms, - modern, traditional and 
saintly (meaning the tradition of Gandhi and Bhave)- as suggested by 
Professor Morris Jones, then this is a continuation of a development 
which has been taking place since the nineteenth century. From the 
1920s onwards each idiom has influenced the other and all helped to 
shape the present political structure of India. It is easy to be dazzled by 
the elite or to get lost in the villages and forget the necessary link 
between the two. The nationalist ideas reached down to the villages, and 
the traditional society conditioned the modern system. The 
multidimensional approach alone will enable us to find all the threads 
that go to make up the complete pattern of fabric of Indian politics. 
29 Ziyh-UI-Hasan Faruqi, The Deobond School and the Demand for Pakistan, London, 
1963, pp. 2-6. 
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